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•
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As to dates and times and ux/ations, Respondent accepts the facts as stated hv

Appellant in lis burl

I

IICR*

;in' hownrr several fioiiih of claritVdlJuii ihal ri *

be

made in order for this Court to take cognizance of the issues now before it* Before
commencing a discussion, of 'those matters, Respondent 'wishes to state that the whole of
Appellant's ca se rests upon the interpretation of the licensing statutes (U.C.A §58-22 et
seq.) and that if Appellant either falls outside of the class whose protection was
contemplated by the Leg) ^\M

\

l

.•
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•

• • i..

\

Appellant's case must fail. Appellant does not appeal from, the jury's verdict and. award of
damages to Respondent,
The "specific" contents of spedl"

sed in making the machine in question

were primarily under the control of App* s. i • * .v hich were changed several tmies h\ ihem
unilaterally
cleaner»« •

appellant's engineer* determine*) that the coils manufactui • <->K ends anu daaca that requirement to the specifications >T -w .; -

Specifications were changed to conform to a limited gauge of wire, not the broad spa'inim
of gauges first liste*

» *•

*

ing dev ice tm 11n •

washers Wei*, an uUunum by Appellant's engineers to the specifications. (T 85, . x i.
269-270) 1 fj"re were severil discuwnns with AprHkr* follow
specificati'

^ <^(

. »e process ..„.

•:

* *>%

l

rvje.s K *h

J.V* ue v. ums>g the

hook off of the pigtails, (T, 232, 234-235) In short, the "specific" specification* Appellant
refers to weren't ii stiitic body of instructions. ;i "d **•*".

* •-

. h.n „./•.-••

°e

peniHJ in question, by the decisions of Appellant ^ engineers, &> well as at the outset \ i
85,86)
Appdimn fiJis ;i staff nt rompeteni nigiiieers., suinc oi vuiom itu", m licensee^ WHO
actively worked on the project (T. 56) Mr, Blackett pulled an engineer from An; Hian* staff "into getting used to the machine and working with Dick on the inmli» • •

48)

Jv Ii Coy met frequentl) with I"\ 1 n: Ii ey to rev iew design (T 138) Mr Ashburn spent

significant time working on the design with Mr. Irey. (T. 425) Mr. Irey visited and
consulted with them often (T. 93) The Quality Control of the coils produced was under the
exclusive control of Appellant. (T. 94)
Appellant paints Respondent as a person who willfully flaunted the provisions of
the licensing statutes. To the contrary, Mr. Irey believed that he was complying with the
statute by using engineers on project. He employed Mr. Linsey, a licensed professional
engineer to "advise, direct and carry out" projects. (T. 428) Mr. Linsey considered himself
as being responsible for the engineering quality of the machine. (T. 433) Mr. Linsey was
compensated for his time (T. 431) (Mr. Linsey was brought into the project and paid for
his time - see Mr. Linsey's Transcript at 18) Mr. Linsey was involved with this project at
virtually every step and ran several tests and analyses on the machine to assure that it was
sound. The depth of his involvement is revealed in his testimony (Mr. Linsey's transcript
pp. 8-13) The following excerpt from Mr. Linsey's testimony proves insightful as to his
overall role in the project:
Q (By Mr. Fankhauser) do you consider yourself to be the
engineer in supervision of this project along with Mr. Irey?
A Overall, making sure that the machine complies with good
engineering practice and manufacturing, yes.
Mr. Linsey consulted regularly with Mr. Irey's company on various projects. (T. 227228) Mr. Linsey handled the design of the frame. (T. 247) He was involved in the project
from the very beginning (T. 249) Mr Irey used Mr. Griffen on the project as a licensed
professional engineer. He also employed Mr. Kirk, an engineer. (T. 423-424) Mr. Irey
called upon other engineers as needed. (T. 429)

There was ample evidence for the jury to conclude that the machine did in fact work
at a higher rate than 400 pieces per hour rate. (Appellant it seems made every effort to
prevent Mr. Irey from testing the machine under actual operating conditions in that
Appellant failed to supply Mr. Irey with the hundreds of parts necessary to complete and
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Appellant **>!!* nu^ .1, ut involved w uh the project in depth as a consultant for Appellant,
believed that the machine was functional at a rate of at least 400 pieces per hour,; and,,
otherwise could save money if only used to pull the pigtails

J15, 208) Hie machine

could not run at the rate of 600 pieces per hour as it was slowed down due to Appellant's

constant and di amatic improvement in the performance of the unn (T 207-208) The
machine had successfully produced thousands of parts, by the resourcefulness of Mr Irey,

reuse. (T. 38 3]

The machine produced bv Mr Trey's company was not intended for public use, nor
<. nr the coiled pam it produced
•

>' * r . v -

r

>-. ,

U

' ,:• " J

- \ t \ unit's witness stated
'

-

f

e

•

u-t

'"

,f,

ve >ell to companies *b"'
'A

Mi.1v ' U H C H J"

M

bmerson, the parent company who used m The machine itself was to be used exclusively

Appellant claimed, and was awarded ownership of the machine * "I 122)
Appellant derived significant benefit from, it by using it for depreciation, against taxes on
Hit'oiiM" I! 1 I I I'll Appellwil stuijtijil iiml iihluiiinl .i rouM older unci exclusive control ot it.
( I 114-115) Appellant received a machine, which, the jury could properly conclude,
functioned, as per the specifications as modified by Appellant's requested changes.
< 'ontrary to will a I Appellant would ha ve this Coui 1: believe, Mi Irey is considered
experienced and innovative by those engineers who worked with him. (Mr, Linsey's

experience. ( I 225-226), and had,,, success*u-

,%;ed projects as,, 01 more

than this one. (T. 229) Although not licensed to practice engineering for the general, lay
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public, his competence when associated with licensed engineers and working on projects
for companies staffed heavily with engineers is well founded.
Finally, the statements of the court concerning the reasons for denying Appellant's
motions below based upon U.C.A. §58-22 are of interest:
The Court: The court denies the motion. The Court does so
for the following reasons: first of all, the Court believes that
the matter's already been ruled on by another judge, and
therefore, is the law of the case. But in addition thereto, the
Court rules that the motion should be denied, first of all, the
corporation -- the undisputed evidence which I have before
me is that the corporation did have available to it the services
of licensed engineers who were concerned with the
construction and were counseled on the matter. In addition
to this, I believe the earlier judge has ruled that this is not
necessarily one of those situations where you are involved in
the protection of the general public, but is - this is a
situation where you're involved in the technical dealings of
corporations, both of which have the services of trained
engineers. (Reporter's transcript on the ruling of the motion,
pp. 18-19, emphasis added)
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1- IS APPELLANT A MEMBER OF THE CLASS WHICH WAS TO BE PROTECTED BY THE
PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. §58-22?;
2- IS RESPONDENT A MEMBER OF A CLASS EXEMPTED FROM THE PROVISIONS OF

U.C.A. §58-22?
3- DID THE EXCLUSION OF A BREACH OF WARRANTY INSTRUCTION RESULT IN
PREJUDICIAL ERROR FROM WHICH APPELLANT MAY RIGHTFULLY CLAIM RELIEF?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

There are no statutes determinative of this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent accepts Appellant's statement of the case as sufficiently accurate for a
determination of this appeal.
SUMMARY OF A R G U M E N T
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Utah Code Annotated Chapter 50 Section 22, et seq., was intended to protect the
lay publicfromfraudand incompetence practiced by unlicensed engineers and was an
appropriate exercise of police powers by the Legislature of the State of Utah. Appellant
Corporation does not fit the classification of lay public supplied by this Court in previous
decisions and cannot therefore hidefromits legitimate obligations to Respondent by raising
the specter of statutory violation. Appellant employed several engineers during the course
of events that led to the trial below. Several of Appellant's dngineers were involved in the
manufacture of the machine in question in that they 1- exercised control of what constituted
the specifications which the machine was to meet; 2- supervised and assisted in the work
performed by Irey while the machine was located at their plant; If Mr. Irey were practicing
fraud upon Appellant or were he incompetent, Appellant was in a position to have made
that judgment at any point and was not in need of the protection which U.C.A. §58-22
affords the lay public. The involvement of Appellant's qualified engineers to such a degree
makes clear the fact that Appellant, strictly an industrial heating manufacturer, is not a
member of the lay public.
Even if, arguendo, Appellant were a member of the class which the statute seeks to
protect, Respondent was a member of that class exempted from its provisions. Respondent
hired licensed engineers to work with him on the manufacture of the machine. Mr. Linsey,
in particular, was hired for the purpose of approving the design of the machine and the
implementation of that design. Both Mr. Linsey and Respondent were of the opinion that
he was to supervise the actual design of the machine to assure that it complied with
standard engineering practices. Furthermore, Respondent, ih good faith, believed that by
hiring licensed engineers to work on and supervise the project he was complying with the
provisions of the statute in question. Since the project was under the supervision of a
licensed engineer and since Respondent acted in good faith, he is exempted from its
provisions.
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Lastly, Point II of Appellant's brief is curious. In the first paragraph of this point it
states that it listed a cause of action against Respondent for Breach of Warranty, and in the
second and concluding paragraph notes that the court below failed to allow and instruction
for the same. Nowhere does Appellant give proof of the fact that it had presented sufficient
proof to support the giving of the instruction, nor does Appellant demonstrate that it was
prejudiced by the failure to give the instruction. That Appellant plead a breach of warranty
is not sufficient enough to warrant its inclusion as a jury instruction. Furthermore, unless
Appellant proves prejudice, the failure to give the instruction is not reversible error.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE CLASS PROTECTED BY UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED §58-22 ET SEQ.

Appellant incorrectly states that "the strength of statutes such as thesc.has been
somewhat eroded in recent years/1 Correcdy stated, the strength of U.C.A. §58-22 has
been improved in recent years since this Court, and others around the nation, have placed
the coverage of the same in a proper context. This statute is, insofar as it is designed to
protect the lay public and legitimate innocents, a proper exercise of the police power of the
state. By enforcing its provisions only where the lay public and legitimate innocents are
involved, the Court has set the penumbra of the same to include those persons which need
protection and to exclude those persons and corporations which have no need of protection
due to their special skills, knowledge and education. Appellant falls into the latter class of
persons. Appellant is an industrial heating manufacturer that sells products to other
industrial and commercial users (T. 6-7. 77)
In Fillmore Products. Inc., v. Western States Paving, Inc., 561 P. 2d 687 (Utah
1977) this Court concluded that "the purpose of licensing is to protect the public . . . there
is no doubt that the purpose of the licensing statute relating to contractors is protection of
the public." (Fillmore at 689) Appellant importantly supports the position that the same
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provisions applied to contractors apply to engineers, and th^t U.C.A. 58 §22 was enacted
in order to protect the public. (Appellant's brief at 33-34) Appellant, however, declines to
define the term public, which burden has therefore fallen to Respondent through neglect.
An important case that establishes the public, non-public distinction is cited by
Appellant: Fillmore Products. Inc.. v. Western States Paving, Inc., 561 P. 2d 687 (Utah
1977). In Fillmore, a subcontractor entered into a contract with a licensed general
contractor, the whole project being under the supervision of a licensed engineer. The Court
concluded that "the licensed contractor cannot invoke the application of the general rule of
denying relief to an unlicensed contractor solely because of tpe latter's non-licensing when
a contract for construction is struck between them." (Fillmore at 690) In Lignell v. Berg.
593 P. 2d 800 (Utah 1979), the Court reaffirmed the Fillmor^ ruling, stating: "In
rFillmorel we adopted the point of view expressed by Professor Corbin, viz., "the general
rule" (of unenforceability) is not to be applied mechanically but in a manner "permitting the
court to consider the merits of the particular case and to avoia unreasonable penalties and
forfeitures." (Lignell at 805) In that same case the Court made it abundandy clear (at 805)
that the statute was designed to protect the public. The Fillmore case clarifies somewhat the
term "public". It doesn't include those who are privy to the knowledge and skills required
by the license. A general contractor cannot therefore bar recovery from a subcontractor
exclusively by reliance on the latter's unlicensed status, because the special knowledge and
skills of the general contractor remove the same from that category known as the "public."
In the same manner, a corporation loaded with trained and highly skilled engineers cannot
bar recovery by one who, although staffed with licensed engineers for that project, was
unlicensed. Appellant, is not a member of the protected class, because of its staff of
qualified engineers which makes it privy to the skills and special knowledge lacking in the
general public.
A more recent case reinforces the public, non-public distinction even further. In
Loader v. Scott Construction Corp.. 681 P. 2d 1227 (Utah 1^84), the Court, emphasizing
7

the expertise of the Defendant (in this case the Plaintiff was unlicensed), modified the terms
public and general public, by using a new and more precise term, the lay public. As
persons trained in the intricacies of legal and judicial practices, our profession separates
itself from the lay public in the area of law, much the same as one trained in construction is
different in skills and knowledge from the lay public in the area of construction and an
engineer is different from those not versed in engineering, the lay engineering public.
Loader makes clear that the lay public is the class protected by licensing statutes. One
should expect that a trained lawyer who worked with a person practicing fraud or an
incompetent would recognize the latter as afraudor an incompetent during the course of a
close relationship. A lawyer needs no protection from such a person, whereas a lone
individual, ignorant of legal practice could easily fall victim to such a one. By analogy, if
Mr. Irey were a fraud or incompetent, something not even raised at trial, one could expect
trained engineers to recognize him as such, yet Mr. Linsey refers to him as a miracle
worker. It is hard to believe that Appellant is in a position to be defrauded by an
incompetent. In the following passage taken from Loader, the Court can easily substitute
the words "licensed contractor" for "qualified engineer", and "Appellant" for "Scott":
"As a licensed contractor, Scott is presumed to possess
expertise in the contracting [engineering] business. Scott,
therefore, is not in need of the protection the licensing statute
was intended to provide the lg£ public. No public policy
would be served by allowing Scott to invoke application of
the [rule] denying relief to an unlicensed contractor. (Loader
at 1229)
Appellant looks to this court to mechanically apply the statute so as to preclude
Respondent from its rightful compensation, when no public policy would be served
thereby and Appellant is in no need of protection. The key to administering justice in the
instant case lies in understanding just what public means, and that Appellant is not a
member of the lay public and needs no protection via the statute. Since Appellant is not a

8

member of the protected class, it cannot successfully maintain its Appeal as to Points I and
III.
POINT II
RESPONDENT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH BELIEVING THAT HE WAS COMPLYING WITH U.C.A.
§58-22 BY HIRING LICENSED ENGINEERS TO WORK ON THE PROJECT.
Mr. Lrey's testimony reveals that he believed that the hiring of licensed engineers to
supervise and participate actively in key aspects of the development of the coiling machine
satisfied the requirements of the licensing statute. Loader states, with regard to good faith
compliance, which is mistaken:
Loader testified that he operated in good faith under the
mistaken belief that his former partner's license applied to
him. Unlike the willful disregard of the licensing statute that
we disapproved of in fGeorge v. Oren Limited Associates.
672 P. 2d 732 (Utah 1983)] at 736-737, we find the
circumstance to be similar to the inadvertent lapse of a
license we identified as a mitigating factor in ^ignell at 805.
A good faith mistake alone will not insulate a contractor from
application of the general rule denying relief. It is, however,
one factor that we may consider in determining the rule's
application. (Loader at 1229-1230)
While Respondent does not argue that this relives itself from ihe responsibility to comply
with the licensing statutes, it establishes a good faith compliance, in contrast to the
inaccurate picture of Mr. Irey painted by Appellant. Taken together with the other factors
involved in this case, to wit., the fact that Appellant is not within the protected class, and
the fact that there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could conclude that the
machine was operative, it is clear that Appellant's case is withdut merit. (Appellant argues
that the machine never was operated for more than 10 - 20 minutes, but this was due to the
Appellant's lack of cooperation in supplying parts for testing the machine over a period of
an hour or more.) It would be patently unfair to give Appellant its requested relief,would
further no important public policy, and would wrongfully punish Respondent.
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Assuming, arguendo, that Appellant was a member of a protected class viz-a-viz the
statute in question, then the fact that there is evidence upon which the jury could conclude
that the machine worked as well as Respondent's good faith compliance with the statute
mitigates Appellant's arguments. Their appeal should not be allowed to stand.
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POINT III
APPELLANT HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE FAILURE TO GIVE AN
INSTRUCTION ON BREACH OF WARRANTY RESULTED IN PREJUDICIAL ERROR, AND HAS
FAILED TO SO PROVE

Respondent would invite this Court to review Point II of Appellant's brief. There
is no mention of the words "prejudicial error" nor any indication that the failure to give the
instruction as requested was supported by evidence and therefore proper. There is no
mention of an abuse of discretion by the Judge below, which must be shown. In E.A.
Strout v. Fov & Sons, 665 P. 2d 1320 (Utah 1983) the Supreme Court held that the view
of the trial court regarding the giving of instructions would not be disturbed absent a
showing of abuse of discretion. There has been no showing of abuse in Appellant's brief.
Furthermore, Appellant has failed to bear an important evidentiary burden. A court
may properly refuse to give a jury instruction where the law governing the case does not
accurately reflect the facts presented at trial (Black v. McK^ight 562 P. 2d 621 (Utah
1977). The duty of the trial court to give competent instruction holds only where
competent evidence has been presented to support its being given.(Black at 622: see also
Power's v. Gene's Bldg. Materials. Inc., 567 P. 2d 174 (Utah 1977)) Appellant presents
no argument in its brief supporting a conclusion that the failure to give the instruction was
in error, the instruction having been supported by competent evidence. In fact, the
instruction wasn't given because there was no supportive evidence below. Point II of
Appellant's brief is therefore without merit and undeserving of the time and attention of this
Court.
CONCLUSIONS

Appellant is not a member of the lay public with regard to the practice of
engineering. Points I & DI of their appeal must fail. Furthermore, a good faith compliance
with the licensing statute was made, the project was supervised by a licensed engineer
assisted by other licensed engineers, and the claim that machine would function as per the
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specifications was supported by the evidence. They have never alleged fraud or
incompetence, or otherwise placed themselves squarely within a protected class. Lasdy,
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the giving of a breach of warranty instruction was a
prejudicial error. The entire appeal is therefore without merit and should be denied and
Respondent awarded its cost, and other relief that justice requires.

Respectfully submitted this

day of November, 1988.

Ephraim H. Fankhauser
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